Why British Crews Loved This ‘Unreliable’ Tank That Kept Breaking Down In The Desert – Hw
June 1941, somewhere in the Libyan desert south of Halfaya Pass, a column of brand new Crusader tanks from the 6th Royal Tank Regiment crests a ridge at full speed chasing what looks like retreating Germans. Every commander in the column is grinning. These are the fastest tanks in North Africa. Nothing can outrun them.
Then the desert floor erupts. Concealed anti-tank guns open fire from three sides. 11 Crusaders are destroyed and six more heavily damaged in minutes. By evening, the regiment is down to 20 operational tanks from 50. The operation fails entirely. Britain loses roughly 100 tanks while destroying just 12 German ones. This is the Crusader’s introduction to war, a disaster.
And yet over the next 18 months, crews will fight, bleed, and die in this tank across every major desert battle from Battleaxe to El Alamein. They will curse its engine, patch its cooling system with wire and prayer, and watch it break down on approach marches at rates that would embarrass a civilian automobile.
Slow, heavy infantry tanks supported foot soldiers. Fast, light cruiser tanks exploited breakthroughs like modern cavalry. The idea borrowed from naval thinking. Cruisers were raiders, not battleships. Speed was armor. Nuffield Mechanizations and Aero Limited, Lord Nuffield’s personal defense enterprise in Birmingham, designed the Crusader as an enlarged version of the earlier A13 cruiser.
In July 1939, the War Office adopted Nuffield’s design as the A15 and ordered 200 tanks straight off the drawing board. No prototypes. The pilot model appeared by March 1940, and testing immediately revealed problems. The auxiliary machine gun turret was nearly unusable. The cooling system overheated. Transmission gear changes were unreliable. None of it was fixed.
Approximately 5,300 were produced in total. The heart of the problem was the engine. The Nuffield Liberty was a licensed British version of the American Liberty L-12, an aircraft engine originally designed in 5 days during June 1917 as a standardized power plant for World War I biplanes. A water-cooled 27-L V12 producing 340 horsepower at a governed 1,500 rpm.
It was re-engineered for tank use, but remained fundamentally an airplane engine asked to do a job it was never built for. Crammed into the Crusader’s low engine compartment, the Liberty’s cooling fans were driven by chains that wore out rapidly, snapped, and caused engines to seize. The Mark III Liberty went through three different chain drive designs before the Mark IV finally switched to shaft drive.
Water pump seals eroded from sand ingress. Oil leaked between the engine block and cylinders under the stress of cross-country travel. Dust infiltrated every mechanical joint, grinding down the gearbox and suspension components. Workshop data from the 7th Division during Operation Crusader in November 1941 tells the story in hard numbers.
The Queen’s Bays Regiment recorded even worse results in January 1942 of 31 Crusader tanks, 21 broke down mechanically. That is a 77% failure rate. By comparison, only two of 19 American M3 Stewarts broke down in the same period, just 11%. The Crusader project’s assessment of this data was blunt.
They described the mechanical performance as appalling. Supply chain problems made everything worse. Tanks arrived in North Africa missing essential tools and servicing manuals. According to persistent anecdotal accounts, dock workers would crane tanks aboard ships and then start engines to drive them into position after all fluids had been removed for shipping.
If true, every Crusader arrived having been briefly run without oil. Worn replacement parts salvaged from other vehicles were fitted when spares ran out. Many already passed their design lifespan. Exhausted crews performed their own substantial mechanical repairs after combat. So, why did they love it? Because the Crusader could do something no other tank in North Africa could match.
It could run at 26 mph on roads and 15 cross-country. The Crusader was faster than anything it faced. Veterans of the 86th anti-tank regiment claimed they removed speed governors from their gun tractors and credited empty Crusaders with speeds up to 55 mph. Fast enough to outrun military police motorcycles limited to 50 on wartime patrol.
The Christie suspension, five large independently sprung road wheels per side, gave superb cross-country ride quality. The tank sat just 7 ft 4 in tall, presenting a low, difficult target when charging across the flat Libyan plains. The gun was balanced with a padded shoulder rest rather than geared elevation, allowing the gunner to control the barrel through body movement.
This made shooting on the move far more accurate than in tanks using geared mechanisms, fitting perfectly with doctrine that emphasized firing while advancing. On the open desert, this capability was devastating. The Crusader embodied the cavalry spirit that many armored regiments inherited from their horse origins. Units like the 4th County of London Yeomanry and the Queen’s Bays brought those traditions into their Crusader squadrons.
It takes a second, costs nothing, and helps the channel grow. Right. Back to the desert. Operation Crusader in November 1941 was the tank’s defining campaign. Named after the vehicle itself, the offensive saw the 7th Armored Division field 455 tanks, with Crusaders forming the majority of cruiser strength. British total tank numbers reached 770 against roughly 395 Axis machines.
On the 19th of November, the inexperienced 22nd Armored Brigade ran into the Italian Ariete Division at Bir el Gubi. 25 Crusaders were knocked out in a sharp engagement. By evening, the brigade had lost about 50 tanks to enemy fire and over 30 to mechanical breakdowns. The Axis communique that night claimed the annihilation of the 22nd Armored Brigade.
The fighting at Sidi Rezegh was worse. Brigadier Jock Campbell led the defense in what became the most famous individual action of the entire campaign. Standing in his open car with a blue flag, Campbell personally formed up tanks under intense fire, directed artillery, and twice manned guns himself to replace casualties.
He was awarded the Victoria Cross. The 6th Royal Tank Regiment’s attempt to charge north to link with the Tobruk breakout force ran straight into 88-mm guns. Only six tanks returned. By the 22nd of November, the 30th Corps had lost two-thirds of its tanks. Between the 18th and the 22nd alone, the British lost 530 tanks while destroying roughly 100 Axis vehicles.
Yet, Operation Crusader was ultimately a strategic British victory. Tobruk was relieved, and Rommel withdrew to El Agheila. It was a Pyrrhic success bought at enormous cost. At the Battle of Gazala in May 1942, British forces fielded 849 tanks, including 257 Crusaders, still the single largest type. The pattern repeated.
German tanks feigned retreat, drawing Crusaders onto concealed anti-tank gun screens. Without high-explosive ammunition for the two-pounder gun, which British doctrine had never produced, Crusader crews had only machine guns to respond against dug-in positions. On the 13th of June, known as Black Saturday, the British lost 138 tanks in hours.
Tobruk fell eight days later. The Crusader’s firepower problem is critical to understanding its combat record. The two-pounder could penetrate early Panzer 3 variants with 30 mm of frontal armor at all combat ranges, but from the Ausf. H onward, with 60 mm of effective frontal protection through add-on plates, the two-pounder bounced off.
Meanwhile, the long 50 mm gun fitted to later Panzer 3s could penetrate any Crusader at over 500 m. The German tank also carried HE rounds, had a full three-man turret crew, and broke down far less often. The Crusader Mark 3 addressed the firepower gap by mounting the QF 6-pounder, achieving a muzzle velocity of 892 m/s and penetrating 81 mm of armor at 500 yd.
This could defeat any Panzer 3 in service, but fitting the larger gun forced the crew down to just three men, with the commander also loading, a severe handicap in sustained combat. According to Bovington Tank Museum records, the Mark 3 saw its major combat debut at the second battle of El Alamein in October 1942.
Montgomery’s Eighth Army fielded 1,029 tanks, including 294 Crusaders. The type was now second to the Sherman and relegated to flanking and screening. The Ninth Armoured Brigade attacked the Axis gun line at Tell el Aqqaqir on the 1st of November with 132 tanks, suffering over 50% casualties. The 6-pounder armed Mark III proved more than a match for mid-generation German armor.
But El Alamein was the Crusader’s last major action as a gun tank. According to P.M. Knight’s definitive archival study, published in 2015, many of the Crusader’s shortcomings stemmed from flawed war office specifications and an inadequate maintenance system rather than purely fundamental design flaws. Knight concluded that properly maintained Crusaders could operate reliably over great distances even in the desert, but the damage to the tank’s reputation was done before solutions arrived.
The Crusader’s story did not end in North Africa. Its chassis proved remarkably versatile. The Crusader III AA Mark I mounted a 40-mm Bofors anti-aircraft gun. The AA Mark II carried twin 20-mm Oerlikon cannons. Both variants deployed for the Normandy landings, though overwhelming Allied air superiority left them with virtually no aerial targets.
Most AA crews transferred to operational squadrons within weeks. The Crusader gun tractor replaced the turret with an armored superstructure to tow the 17-pounder anti-tank gun across northwest Europe. 600 were built. Egyptian Crusader AA tanks were still operational during the 1956 Suez Crisis, 15 years after the type’s combat debut.
The Crusader tank was ordered into production without prototypes to fill an emergency that left no room for perfection. It was powered by a World War I aircraft engine reconfigured into a space it was never designed for and sent to fight in an environment that punished every mechanical compromise. Yet, it was the fastest tank in the desert, admired by enemies who captured and used it, and crewed by men who loved its speed even as they cursed its reliability.
The real lesson is not that British tanks were bad. It is that doctrine, logistics, and maintenance systems matter as much as hardware. The flawed cruiser versus infantry tank split, the absence of HE ammunition for a perfectly capable gun, the maintenance burden placed on exhausted crews, the shipping negligence that damaged tanks before they reached the front.
These systemic failures created the Crusader’s reputation. The system around the tank failed before the tank itself did. The numbers prove it. The documents confirm it. The legends enhance it. British engineering gave the Crusader speed that nothing could match. British doctrine asked it to do things no tank should have been asked to do alone.
And British crews, the men who knew every flaw and loved it anyway, made it work when it mattered most. That is the story of the Crusader, the most unreliable tank they could not bear to give up.
QQ4 Bob Dylan and Keith Richards have been close friends for nearly 40 years. The friendship began on a live television program in November of 1986 in the 11 seconds after Bob Dylan called Keith Richards music derivative on camera. Keith Richard’s response to that assessment, one sentence said without anger, without performance, with the specific directness of a man who has nothing to prove and knows it made Bob Dylan laugh.
Then made Bob Dylan go quiet. then made Bob Dylan say two words that people who know Bob Dylan say he almost never said to anyone. This is the story of those 11 seconds and the 40 years that followed them. The program was a live music interview special broadcast on an American network on the evening of November 3rd, 1986. The format was simple.
Two musicians, a host, an hour of conversation about music and the state of it. The producers had assembled the pairing of Bob Dylan and Keith Richards with the specific calculation of television producers who understand that two people with equally strong and potentially incompatible views about what music is and what it should do will produce better television than two people who agree about everything.
The calculation was correct, though not in the way the producers had anticipated. Bob Dylan was 45 years old in November of 1986. Bob Dylan had released Empire Burlesque the previous year and had been on the road for most of the intervening period as part of the True Confessions tour with Tom Petty and the Heartbreakers.
Bob Dylan was in November of 1986 in one of the most prolific and restless phases of a career that had consisted almost entirely of prolific and restless phases. A career that had moved through folk, rock, country, gospel, and back again, that had been declared finished at least six times by the music press, and at each time continued with the serene indifference of a river to the opinions of people standing on its banks.
Bob Dylan had been redefining what music could be. Since 1962, Bob Dylan had invented and reinvented himself so many times that reinvention had become his defining characteristic, not in the superficial sense of a performer changing costumes, but in the deeper sense of a musician who had never allowed his work to settle into a form that could be anticipated or categorized from the outside.
Bob Dylan understood influence and originality and the relationship between them better than almost anyone alive in 1986. Bob Dylan had spent 24 years thinking carefully and specifically about where music came from and where music was going and what it meant that those two things were always in constant conversation with each other.
Keith Richards was 42 years old in November of 1986. Keith Richards had been playing guitar professionally since 1962. Keith Richards had built a career on a foundation of American blues and rhythm and blues. A foundation that Keith Richards had studied with the systematic devotion of someone who understood that the tradition he was building on was not incidental to the music he was making, but essential to it.
that you could not understand what Keith Richards did without understanding where Keith Richards had come from and what Keith Richards had been listening to since he was a teenager in Dartford with American Import Records and a secondhand guitar and no teacher except the recordings themselves. Keith Richards had never pretended otherwise. Keith Richards had in fact spent considerable energy across his career making the lineage explicit, naming the artists, citing the recordings, insisting on the acknowledgement of influence that the mainstream music
industry had a long history of suppressing or ignoring or crediting to the wrong people. If anything, Keith Richards was more transparent about his sources than most musicians of his generation. Keith Richards had always said openly that the Rolling Stones came directly from the blues, that Muddy Waters and Robert Johnson and the specific tradition of the Mississippi Delta were not background influences, but foundational ones.
The music Keith Richards made was in direct and sustained conversation with that tradition, something Keith Richards considered not a limitation, but a responsibility and a form of respect. The interview had been running for 8 minutes when the host asked Bob Dylan about the current state of rock and roll.
Bob Dylan answered with the density and the indirection that characterized Bob Dylan’s responses to direct questions, turning the question over, approaching it from an unexpected angle, finding his way to what he actually thought through a series of observations that moved like a river rather than a road. Bob Dylan was not a straightforward interview subject.
Bob Dylan had been asked about rock and roll in hundreds of interviews across 24 years and had developed the habit of treating the question as an invitation to think out loud rather than a request for a prepared position. The producer Gerald Sherman said afterward that in the first 8 minutes of the interview, he had been slightly anxious, not because anything was going wrong, but because nothing was going anywhere in particular yet.
The interview had the feeling of two conversations happening simultaneously. Bob Dylan’s internal one and the external one visible to the cameras. And Gerald Sherman was not certain in those first eight minutes that the two conversations would converge into something. Bob Dylan talked about influence. Bob Dylan talked about originality.
Bob Dylan talked about the difference between music that absorbed a tradition and transformed it and music that absorbed a tradition and reproduced it. And then Bob Dylan made his assessment. And then Bob Dylan said with the precision of a man making a musical assessment rather than a personal judgment that the Rolling Stones work, and Bob Dylan was specific, naming Keith Richards as the guitarist whose approach he was discussing was derivative in a way that Bob Dylan found limiting.
Bob Dylan said it without hostility. Bob Dylan said it as a technical observation about the relationship between source material and the work that came from it. Bob Dylan said that Keith Richards played the blues the way the blues had already been played, rather than using the blues as a starting point for something that had not yet been played.
Keith Richards had been listening to this with the specific attention Keith Richards gave to things being said about music by people who knew music. Keith Richards did not interrupt. Keith Richards did not shift in his chair or display any of the visible signals of a person preparing a defensive response. Keith Richards listened to Bob Dylan’s complete observation all the way to its conclusion without interrupting and without displaying any visible signal of preparing a response.
Then Keith Richards said one sentence. The sentence was not a rebuttal. The sentence did not defend Keith Richards music or argue for its originality or challenge Bob Dylan’s characterization of what the blues meant in the context of rock and roll. The sentence was something else entirely, something that required a specific kind of confidence to say.
The confidence of a person who has spent long enough thinking about the same things as the person they are talking to that they can locate the exact point where their thinking diverges and say something useful about that point rather than simply defending their own position. The sentence acknowledged everything Bob Dylan had said, the assessment, the distinction Bob Dylan was drawing, the specific musical concern underlying the observation, and then turned it 90°.
Keith Richards took Bob Dylan’s own framework, the one Bob Dylan had used to analyze Keith Richards relationship to the blues tradition, and applied it back to Bob Dylan’s work with the same precision Bob Dylan had used to apply it to Keith Richards. Spare aimed. The sentence asked Bob Dylan something about Bob Dylan’s own music, about the relationship between Bob Dylan’s sources and Bob Dylan’s output that Bob Dylan had not been asked on television before.
The sentence did not attack. The sentence illuminated. Bob Dylan laughed. The laugh was not the polite laugh of someone responding to a joke. The laugh was the involuntary laugh of someone who has been genuinely surprised. The specific kind of surprise that a person of exceptional intelligence experiences when someone else’s intelligence exceeds their expectations.
Bob Dylan laughed for 4 seconds. Then Bob Dylan stopped laughing. Then Bob Dylan was quiet for 3 seconds in the way that Bob Dylan was quiet when Bob Dylan was thinking rather than performing thought. Then Bob Dylan said, “You’re right.” The producer in the booth, a man named Gerald Sherman, who had been working in television for 14 years, said afterward that in 14 years of live television production, he had never heard Bob Dylan say those two words in a public forum.
Gerald Sherman said he had worked with Bob Dylan on two previous occasions and had observed Bob Dylan in numerous other contexts and that you’re right was not a phrase that Bob Dylan deployed easily or often because Bob Dylan had spent 24 years being right about music in ways that other people eventually caught up with. And the experience of being right ahead of everyone else does not generally produce a man who says you’re right readily when someone else makes a point.
The host of the program, a journalist named Patricia Wells, who had been interviewing musicians for 12 years, said afterward that the 11 seconds between Bob Dylan’s assessment and Bob Dylan saying, “You’re right,” were the most extraordinary 11 seconds of television she had been present for. Patricia Wells said that what she witnessed in those 11 seconds was not a debate or a confrontation or a celebrity exchange of competing opinions.
Patricia Wells said what she witnessed was one musician recognizing another musician as an equal, which was in the specific context of Bob Dylan in 1986, not something that happened in public very often. The interview continued for another 42 minutes after those 11 seconds. The conversation between Bob Dylan and Keith Richards in the remaining 42 minutes was described by everyone who watched it as fundamentally different from the first 8 minutes.
The host, Patricia Wells, who had been conducting music interviews for 12 years and understood the difference between the performance of conversation and actual conversation, said that at approximately the 9-minute mark, something shifted in the studio. That the formal interview, architecture dissolved, and what replaced it was something less structured and more genuine.
Bob Dylan and Keith Richards talked about influence and originality and the blues and what it meant to build on a tradition without being consumed by it. They talked about specific recordings and specific musicians with the specificity of two people who had spent their entire adult lives thinking about these things and rarely found another person who had thought about them with equivalent care.
They talked about where music came from and where music was going and whether those two questions were actually one question or two. Patricia Wells said afterward that she had asked approximately four questions in the remaining 42 minutes because Bob Dylan and Keith Richards did not require questions. They required only a room and a camera and the shared understanding that what they were saying together was worth recording carefully.
She said it was the best interview she had ever conducted and that she had conducted the smallest part of it. After the program, Bob Dylan and Keith Richards were in the corridor outside the studio when the host Patricia Wells passed them. Patricia Wells said she did not stop because she did not want to interrupt.
She observed them for approximately 30 seconds from a distance. She said they were talking with the ease of people who had known each other for years rather than people who had met for the first time 2 hours earlier. She said that something had shifted between them during the broadcast that the broadcast had made permanent rather than temporary.
She continued down the corridor and did not look back. She said in her account of that evening that she had decided in that moment not to interrupt the conversation because some conversations are more valuable than any question a journalist might ask and that the conversation she had observed for 30 seconds in the corridor outside the studio was one of them.
She had been a music journalist for 12 years. She recognized the difference. Bob Dylan and Keith Richards have maintained their friendship across four decades. They have appeared together at various events, most significantly at the concert for the Rock and Roll Hall of Fame in 1995, where people who were present described them as inseparable for most of the evening, occupying the same corner of the backstage area and talking with the concentrated attention of people who only have a limited amount of time together and intend to use it
well. Bob Dylan has spoken about Keith Richards in interviews with the specific thoughtful care that Bob Dylan reserves for musicians whose work Bob Dylan considers genuinely important rather than merely culturally prominent. Keith Richards has spoken about Bob Dylan in similar terms with the specific respect of someone who recognizes in another person a commitment to music that goes deeper than career.
Neither Bob Dylan nor Keith Richards has made a public statement specifically about how the friendship began or about the November 1986 interview. Bob Dylan has not mentioned the 11 seconds. Keith Richards has not mentioned the sentence. The interview exists in the archive. The 11 seconds are there. The laugh is there. The two words are there.
What is also there for anyone who watches the interview from its beginning and pays attention to the shift that happens at the 9-minute mark is the specific moment when two people who thought they were appearing on a television program discovered they were actually talking to each other. What Keith Richards said in that one sentence has never been officially reported.
The people who were in the studio that evening, Gerald Sherman, Patricia Wells, the floor crew, the two camera operators, the makeup artist who was watching from the side of the set, have described the sentence in consistent terms. They have described its effect. They have described Bob Dylan’s laugh and Bob Dylan’s silence and Bob Dylan’s two words.
They have not repeated the sentence itself in the specific understanding that the sentence was said between two musicians on a television program and that its power resided in the specific context of that exchange and would not survive removal from it intact. What can be said is this. Keith Richards said something to Bob Dylan about Bob Dylan’s music that used Bob Dylan’s own observation about Keith Richards as its starting point and arrived somewhere that Bob Dylan had not anticipated.
Keith Richards turned Bob Dylan’s assessment 90° and showed Bob Dylan something about the music they had both spent their lives making that Bob Dylan recognized immediately as true. And Bob Dylan said, “You’re right.” Two words said by Bob Dylan in public on live television in 1986 to Keith Richards in response to a single sentence Keith Richards had said about music.
Two words that Gerald Sherman, who had worked with Bob Dylan on two previous occasions, said he had never heard Bob Dylan say in a public forum. Two words that Patricia Wells, who had been interviewing musicians for 12 years, said were the most significant two words she had heard in those 12 years. Not because of their content, but because of who said them and what it cost to say them and what it meant that Keith Richards had produced them in 11 seconds from a conversation that began with Bob Dylan calling Keith Richards’s music derivative. And Keith Richards and
Bob Dylan have been close friends for nearly 40 years. The sentence did its work in 11 seconds on the evening of November 3rd, 1986. The work has been ongoing ever since. If this story moved you, subscribe and leave a comment below. Have you ever said something to someone that turned a potential disagreement into an unexpected and lasting connection? Tell us about it in the comments below.
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