Casino Shows the Skim Failing — Here’s How the FBI Did It HT
In Casino, there’s a scene you’ve watched a dozen times. Arty Piscano, the Kansas City guy, the one with the grocery store, stands behind his counter ranting about airfare and hotel expenses while his mother tells him to calm down. He’s writing everything in a notebook, every dollar, every name.
And upstairs in an apartment the FBI bugged for an unrelated case, a realto-real tape recorder is catching all of it. That’s how the film says the government found the skim. A loud mouth and a lucky microphone. A comedy of errors that handed the FBI a case they weren’t even looking for.
That scene is a lie, not a dramatization, not a simplification, a fundamental misrepresentation of what actually happened. The real man behind Arty Piscano was Carl Tffy Duna, the underboss of the Kansas City crime family. Not a grocery store owner, not a fool, and not a man who lost control of his mouth.
Duna was feared, disciplined, and meticulous. He kept coded records, but he kept them hidden in his basement behind ventilation ducts, not scrolled on a counter where anyone could read them. And the FBI didn’t find the skim by accident. They found it on June 2nd, 1978 through a hidden microphone they deliberately planted at the Villa Capri Pizzeria on Independence Avenue in Kansas City.
a booth where Duna and acting boss Carl Cork Sevela sat down to discuss a multi-million dollar Las Vegas casino operation. While the bee’s staying alive played on the jukebox, the agents on the other end of that wire weren’t expecting Las Vegas. They were investigating mob murders in the River Key Entertainment District.
But what they heard that night launched the largest organized crime investigation in Nevada history. An operation called Strawman that would span four cities, deploy more wiretaps than any federal case before it, and produce 19 convictions across four crime families.
This is the story of how the FBI actually dismantled the most profitable criminal operation in American history. And the detail the film left out, the one that changes everything about who the real protagonist of this story was, is something Scorsesei either didn’t know or chose not to tell you.
That’s the version of the Las Vegas skim most people carry in their heads. The Scorsesei version where the mob ate itself alive through greed and stupidity and the feds swept up what was left. The court transcripts, the FBI surveillance logs, and the trial testimony tell a different story.
What ended the mob’s 30-year hold on Las Vegas wasn’t self-destruction. It was a methodical multi-year investigation run out of a field office in Kansas City, Missouri by agents who built their case one wiretap at a time. And at the center of that operation, hidden in plain sight for decades, was a secret that reframes the entire film.
Here’s a number that explains how the whole machine worked. $15,000. That’s what it cost to buy. A rigged counting room scale at the Stardust Resort and Casino. The return on that investment was millions per year, siphoned out of the largest casino on the Las Vegas strip without a single dollar appearing on any official ledger.
The skim wasn’t a shakedown. It was an engineering project. And it started with a loan. In August of 1974, a 32-year-old San Diego real estate developer named Allan Glick received 62.75 million from the Teamsters Central States Pension Fund, the largest single loan the fund had ever made.
The money bought Glick control of four casinos, the Stardust, the Fremont, the Hienda, and the Marina. He called the holding company Argent Corporation. A RG for Alan Rlick, E N T for enterprises. Glick was a decorated Vietnam helicopter pilot. He looked clean on paper. That was the point.
The loan had been arranged by Kansas City boss Nick Sevela, Milwaukee boss Frank Balistrieri, and Cleveland’s liaison to the pension fund, Milton Rockman, each of whom controlled a trustee. Total Teamsters financing would eventually reach approximately $146 million. But Glick wasn’t running the casinos.
He was the name on the license, the man who actually ran everything. The pit operations, the sports book, the entertainment, the hiring, the comps, the kitchen was Frank Lefty Rosenthal, installed by the Chicago Outfits top bosses, Tony Aardo and Joey Aupa, at a salary of $250,000 a year.
His official title was executive consultant. His actual authority was total. When Glick once pushed back on a decision, Rosenthal told him, “You’re not my boss, and if you interfere with what’s going on here, you will never leave this corporation alive.” Glick stopped pushing back. The primary mechanism for the skim at the Stardust was the hard count room, the room where slot machine coins were weighed and recorded.
Bags of nickels of quarters and dollar tokens came off the casino floor in steel cages were placed on ultra sensitive industrial scales capable of counting 20,000 nickels with accuracy to within two coins and the weight was converted to a dollar figure that became the casino’s official revenue. A scale mechanic hired specifically for this purpose recalibrated those scales approximately 10% light.
$1,000 in quarters registered as 900. The missing 10% never existed on paper. It was recycled through a system unique to the Stardust. Locked coin cabinets installed along the casino walls. Change girls deposited customers bills into dropboxes and took rolls of surplus coins from these cabinets.

Each evening, the cabinets could hold up to $10,000 in untraceable bills. Cash that had entered the casino through the front door and was now flowing out through a side channel that no auditor would ever see. Even more brazen was the unregistered change booth. It looked identical to every other booth on the Stardust floor.
Same signage, same layout, same personnel rotation. It was not registered with any governmental authority. 100% of the money that flowed through that booth went directly to the Chicago outfit. It operated for nearly 5 years. The man who designed the system, the rigged scales, the wall cabinets, the ghost booth was slot department manager J. Vandermark.
When Nevada gaming investigators began closing in on the operation in 1976, Vandermark disappeared. He was given what sources describe as an all expense paid trip to Mazatlan, Mexico, where his head was bashed in while sunbathing on a beach. His body was never recovered.
And the same roots that moved skimmed cash out of the Stardust would within 3 years become the subject of the most extensive wiretap operation in the history of federal law enforcement. A parallel skim operated at the Tropicana run by the atipim Kansas City family through Joe Agusto a Sicilian immigrant who’d infiltrated the casino through his role producing the Foley’s Berser stage show there.
Casino manager Carl Thomas and assistant manager Billy Caldwell used a crude method. falsified fill slips, forged signatures, cash stolen directly from the cashier’s cage. From June through October of 1978, the Tropicana crew skimmed over $40,000 a month. The dollar figures on the overall skim vary depending on the source and time period.
The Nevada Gaming Control Board determined approximately 7 million was taken from slot machines alone between 1974 and 76. Federal prosecutors proved 2 million at trial, the minimum they could document beyond dispute. The broadest published estimate from gaming historian Steve Fiser claims 15 million per year for 5 years.
The truth is somewhere in that range and one person inside this operation was already talking to the FBI. Though it wasn’t who anyone expected, Carl Caruso made at least 18 round trips between Las Vegas and Kansas City carrying skimmed cash in a briefcase on commercial flights dressed in business attire at a rate of $1,000 per delivery.
He turned the money over to Charles Moritina, Sevela’s man in Kansas City. For the Chicago part, Anthony Chiavala, Senior, a sitting Chicago police officer who was also Sevela’s nephew, transported cash to outfit boss Joey Aupa and under boss Jackie Cerrone. For Cleveland, Milton Rockman made the trip himself.
The split among the four participating families was not fixed from the start. Initially, only Kansas City, Milwaukee, and Cleveland shared the Argent, the three families that had arranged the Teamsters loan. Chicago entered later. When Kansas City and Milwaukee began arguing over percentages, Joey Ayupa was called in to mediate.
His solution was simple. give Chicago 25% of everything. In October 1977, meeting in Chicago, later captured on Wiretap, formalized the arrangement going forward. The Tropicana skim was separate. Kansas City kept the bulk because Sevela had set it up independently, though he sent a percentage to IUPA out of deference.
Here’s the structural fact that the film buries entirely. The five families of New York, the organizations, the public associates with the mafia, the ones that dominate every book, every documentary, every HBO series had virtually no piece of the Las Vegas ski. The most lucrative criminal revenue stream in the country was controlled by four Midwest families that most Americans couldn’t name.
Kansas City, Chicago, Milwaukee, Cleveland. Not Gambino, not Genovves, not Lucesi. The geography of the real operation looked nothing like the mythology. Before I get to how the FBI actually cracked this open and the method was nothing like what the film shows, I’d be curious what you think.
Why did Scorsesei reduce four crime families and a multi-ity conspiracy to what looks like one disorganized crew run out of a Kansas City grocery store? Was it a dramatic economy or was he protecting someone? Let me know. The FBI didn’t find the Las Vegas ski by looking for it.
They found it because two Kansas City mobsters sat down at a bug table and couldn’t stop talking. In the spring of 1978, agents from the Kansas City Field Office were investigating a series of mob bombings and murders in the River Key Entertainment District. A turf war between factions of the TLA organization that had left buildings in rubble and bodies in cars.

They planted a hidden microphone in a back booth at the Villa Capri Pizzeria, 2609 Independence Avenue. a restaurant in Kansas City’s northeast neighborhood where mob figures gathered regularly. On the evening of June 2nd, 1978, Cork Sevela and Tffy Duna walked in and sat at the bug table. The agents on the other end expected to hear about River Key.
Instead, they heard Las Vegas, casino names, Teamsters loans, hidden ownership, a deal with Chicago. Duna referenced being in on $2 million a month. Then he said a sentence that changed the direction of the entire investigation. I don’t want to call him from here. I think we ought to just go to a phone. Billy, the FBI organized crime squad supervisor who listened to that recording understood immediately.
[snorts] Duna was using payoneses to communicate with Las Vegas. If the FBI could identify which payones he used, they could tap them. Lei formed a dedicated surveillance squad to follow Duna through Kansas City and map his communication patterns. The pay phone wire taps proved, in Uli’s own words, extraordinarily productive.
From that single microphone in a pizzeria, the investigation expanded to wire taps and bugs in Milwaukee, Las Vegas, Chicago, and 19 separate wires in Kansas City alone. Agents tapped phones in lawyers offices, insurance companies, private homes, garages, automobiles, and a Chicago strip club called the Admiral Theater, where outfit bosses held meetings.
They set up phony businesses as cover for surveillance posts. It was described as the first time in the 14-year history of the Federal Omnibus Crime Act that government agents had made such extensive use of courtapproved clandestine surveillance. The three le agents, Uli, Lee Floy, and Shea Arie, worked alongside a Kansas City police intelligence detective named Gary Jenkins, who helped track mob members and identify their routines.
This is worth pausing on. Call it the inversion principle, the structural insight the film completely obscures. The FBI broke the biggest Las Vegas case in history without ever running the investigation from Las Vegas. The critical discovery was in Kansas City. The wiretaps were in Kansas City. The raids were in Kansas City.
The trials would be held in Kansas City. The mob’s operational security inside the casinos was irrelevant because the vulnerability was a thousand miles away in the restaurants, living rooms, and pay phone booths where the bosses discuss their business as if no one could hear. On November 26th, 1978, the investigation captured what may have been its most devastating recording.
Carl Thomas, the Tropicana casino manager, and Joe Austoto flew to Kansas City to meet the Sevelas in Duna at the home of Josephine Marlo, a Sevela relative. The house was bugged. Thomas, apparently unable to resist showing off, gave the assembled mobsters a tutorial on casino skimming.
He explained how the scales worked, how Philill slips were falsified, and how the change girls moved cash. He even told them how much his rigged scale had cost, $15,000. Then came Valentine’s Day, 1979. FBI agents executed simultaneous raids across Kansas City. At Duna’s home, the Ye found what no one expected.

Hidden in the basement, attic, and ventilation ducts, Duna had kept meticulous handwritten ledger notes documenting the entire skim operation. Coded records tracking dispersements, meetings, courier schedules, payments to each family, threats delivered to Alen Glick, and even a welfare system for elderly mobsters.
The feared under boss had been running his own accounting department. Ulley later claimed he had no difficulty cracking the code. That same day, agents intercepted courier Carl Caruso at the Kansas City airport carrying $80,000 in skim cash. It was the first time ski money had been physically seized in transit.
The Tropicana skim ended that afternoon. and Duna’s ledger notes, those pages pulled from behind air ducts in a Kansas City basement would prove more devastating at trial than any informant’s testimony because the defense couldn’t claim the handwriting was lying. The investigation produced two federal prosecutions both tried in the Western District of Missouri before Judge Joseph Stevens Jr.
with David Helfrey of the DOJ Organized Crime Strike Force as lead prosecutor. The first was Strawman One, the Tropicana case. Its star witness was Joe Agusto, who flipped in April of 1983 after being convicted of bank fraud in Minneapolis. Agusto plead guilty to the $280,000 Tropicana skim conspiracy and testified in detail about how he had infiltrated the casino and Savella’s orders, how the crew operated night by night, and how Cash traveled to Kansas City. The trial concluded in July of 83 with seven convictions. Duna received 30 years and $130,000 fine. Cork Sevela received 35 years. Mortina got 20. Chaveala
got 15. Nick Sevela, the boss who’d orchestrated everything. The man who had recited the names and ages of Alan Glick’s children as a threat, never faced trial. He died of lung cancer on March 12th, 1983, 2 weeks after his release from prison. Then on August 30th, Agusto himself died of a heart attack in federal custody at a Kansas City hospital and the prosecution lost its primary witness for the upcoming Argent case.
Stman II, the Stardust and Fremont case, was indicted September 30th, 1983, charging 15 defendants across four crime families. The trial began September 23rd, 1985 and lasted 4 months. The government’s evidence included over 30 hours of FBI wiretap recordings, Deluna’s coded ledger notes, and a lineup of cooperating witnesses that no defense attorney could neutralize.
Alan Glick testified under full immunity in November of 85. He described how Sevela told him at a 1975 meeting that if it were his choice, Glick would never leave the room alive, then named Glick’s children by name and age. When Cella later decided Glick had to sell the casinos, Duna told him, “You might think of your life as expendable, but you might not think of your children’s lives as expendable.
” Angelo Lonardo, the Cleveland underboss, the highest ranking mafia member in American history to testify for the government, took the stand and described receiving $8,000 to $40,000 per month as his family’s share. Roy Williams, the former Teamsters president, appeared under heavy marshall guard and admitted to a 30-year relationship with the Sevela organization and the $1,500 monthly payments that had bought his pension fund vote.
On January 21st, 1986, the jury returned guilty verdicts on all eight counts. Joey Aayupa 28 1/2 years and 80,000 in fines. Jackie Cerrone 28 1/2 years. Angelo Leatra 16 years. Joe Lombardo 16 years. Milton Rockman’s 24 years. The eighth circuit upheld every conviction on appeal. The film shows the bosses being arrested as an afterthought.
a montage of handcuffs set to voice over narration compressed into maybe 90 seconds of screen time. The real trial lasted 4 months. It featured the most senior mob witnesses who had ever taken a federal stand and the sentences guaranteed that every major defendant would die behind bars. Here’s what stays with me about the structure of this case.
The FBI ran the entire investigation out of Kansas City. The wiretaps were in Kansas City. The raids were in Kansas City. The trials were in Kansas City. The city that everybody pictures when they think about the mob in Las Vegas, Las Vegas itself, was almost incidental to the prosecution. Do you think that’s why the film buries the investigation? Because a story about patient FBI work in a Midwest field office doesn’t fit the mythology Scorsesei was building.
I’d be curious where you land on that. Tony Spelatro’s case was severed from the Straw Man trial because of heart bypass surgery. He never saw a courtroom. The Chicago outfit made sure of that. On June 14th, 1986, 5 months after the straw man two verdicts, Spyotro and his brother Michael were driven to a house in Bensonville, Illinois near O’Hare airport.
Tony had been told he was attending a ceremony to elevate him within the organization. Michael, who had no involvement in the skim, no role in Las Vegas operations, no history of violence, had been told the same thing. He believed he was about to be made. When they walked into the basement, approximately 15 outfit members were waiting.
In casino, Nikki Santoro and his brother are beaten with baseball bats and buried alive while still breathing. The documented testimony delivered at the 2007 family secrets trial by cooperating witness Nicholas Calibrazi, who was present, tells a different story. There were no bats.
The brothers were beaten with fists and feet. Tony reportedly asked, “Can I say a prayer before the group swarmed him?” Michael Spelatro died in that basement believing until the moment the first blow landed that he was being honored. The bodies were buried in a 5-ft grave in an Indiana cornfield near Enos.
A farmer discovered them 9 days later while plowing. In 2007, James Marcelo was convicted of the murders and sentenced to life. If this is the kind of story that keeps you here, a subscribe means I keep making them. After Frank Rosenthal died of a heart attack in Miami Beach on October 13th, 2008 at the age of 79, the Las Vegas Review Journal’s Jane Anne Morrison published a story that had been waiting decades to be told.
Three former law enforcement sources confirmed to Morrison that Rosenthal had been a top echelon FBI informant, the bureau’s highest classification for a human source, possibly since his years in Chicago before he ever set foot in Lassou, Vegas. His code name was reportedly Achilles.
Morrison’s sources told her he talked about everything and everyone whether he had firstirthand knowledge like he did at the Stardust or second and thirdand knowledge like at the Tropicana. In Casino, Ace Rothstein is the narrator. He’s the protagonist. He’s the man who builds the operation, watches the empire crumble around him through the failures of others, and walks away diminished but alive.
the last rational man in a world of animals. Robert Dairo plays him as the smartest person in every room. The one who sees everything and controls what he can until control becomes impossible. That’s the film’s thesis. A competent man surrounded by incompetence. A tragedy of environment rather than character.
The real Frank Rosenthal was feeding information to the FBI while running the biggest skim in casino history. He was never charged in either Strawman prosecution despite being identified by multiple sources as the man who orchestrated the Stardust operation. The reason it now appears is that he was the government’s asset the entire time.
Jerry McGee Rosenthal, his wife, the woman Sharon Stone played in the film, was also an FBI informant, handled by the same agent, neither spouse knowing about the other. Joe Austo was caught on a 1978 wiretap calling Rosenthal a snitch who would bite the hand that feeds him. Mob suspicion that turned out to be exactly right. The film’s greatest character was the investigation’s greatest asset.
The story Scorsesei told is a tragedy, a man who lost everything because the people around him couldn’t hold the line, was in fact a story of systematic betrayal from within. And the man doing the betraying was the one holding the microphone for the entire film. If the fact that the real Ace Rothstein was an FBI informant the entire time is the kind of thing that changes how you watch the film, and I think it should.
A like tells me to keep going deeper on the stories behind the stories. Alan Dorfman never got the chance to testify. On January 20th, 1983, the Teamsters pension fund controller, who had approved $146 million in loans to Alan Glick, was shot seven times in the head with a 22 caliber pistol in the parking lot of the Hyatt Lincolnwood Hotel in suburban Chicago.
He had just been convicted in a separate bribery case and faced 55 years. The mob killed him because they believed correctly that he was about to cooperate. His murder has never been solved. Roy Williams resigned as Teamsters president in April of 83, cooperated with the government, was parrolled in August of 88, and died on his farm in Leon, Missouri in April of 1989 at 74.
Cork Sevela died in a Fort Worth prison on October 2nd, 1994. Carl Duna, the man whose coded ledger notes broke the case open, the man the film turned into a screaming grocery store owner, died of natural causes on July 21st, 2008. Alan Glick escaped prosecution entirely through his cooperation, returned to San Diego real estate and died in La Hoya on August 2nd, 2021 at 79.
Rosenthal was placed in Nevada’s Black Book in 1987, banning him from every casino in the state. He spent his final years in Florida running a sports handicapping website, watching the film that made him famous, and telling interviewers that Dairo had captured about 70% of who he was.
He never mentioned the other 30%. The Stardust Resort and Casino, the flagship of the skim operation, where the rigged scales measured 10% light and the unregistered change booth sent every dollar to Chicago for nearly 5 years, was demolished by implosion on March 13th, 2007. The site on the north end of the strip is now Resort’s World Loss.
Vegas, a $4.3 billion mega resort that opened in 2021. The Stardust’s original neon sign, the massive electric purple and blue starburst that once marked the entrance to the most profitable mob operation in American history, sits in the neon museum’s outdoor boneyard on Las Vegas Boulevard North, unlit, facing a parking lot.
The tourists who stop to photograph it do so because the sign is beautiful, not because they know what happened inside the building it used to advertise. eyes.
