What JFK Said to Israel About Nuclear Weapons DD

May 18th, 1963. The White House, Washington, D.C. President John F. Kennedy sits at his desk in the Oval Office. He is composing a letter. The letter is addressed to Prime Minister David Bengurion of Israel. It is not a friendly letter. It is barely diplomatic. Kennedy writes, “This government’s commitment to and support of Israel could be seriously jeopardized if it should be thought that we were unable to obtain reliable information on a subject as vital to peace as the question of Israel’s effort in the nuclear field.”

This is the strongest language Kennedy has used with Israel. It is almost an ultimatum. The subject is Israel’s nuclear facility at Deona in the Ngev Desert. Kennedy wants American inspectors to have full access to the facility. Israel has been refusing and Kennedy has had enough. Less than one month after this letter is sent, David Bengurion will resign as Prime Minister of Israel.

6 months after this letter, John F. Kennedy will be dead. This is the story of what JFK said to Israel about nuclear weapons. How he pressured Israel to stop its nuclear program and how the conflict between Kennedy and Ben Gurion became one of the most serious crises in USIsrael relations. Let’s begin by understanding what was happening at Deona and why Kennedy cared so deeply about it.

In 1958, Israel began construction of a nuclear reactor in the Ngev Desert near the town of Deona. The facility was built with French assistance. France provided the reactor design, the equipment, and technical expertise. Israel told the world the facility was a textile plant. Later, Israel said it was a research reactor for peaceful purposes. Both statements were lies.

The facility at Deona was designed to produce plutonium for nuclear weapons. American intelligence agencies discovered the construction in 1960. U2 spy plane flights over Israel photographed the site. CIA analysts studied the photos. They concluded Israel was building a nuclear reactor far larger than needed for research.

They concluded Israel intended to develop nuclear weapons. In December 1960, outgoing President Dwight Eisenhower confronted Israeli officials about Deona. Bengurion, who was Prime Minister, admitted the facility existed, but insisted it was purely for peaceful research. Eisenhower was skeptical, but left the problem for the incoming president.

John F. Kennedy became president on January 20th, 1961. He inherited the Deona problem and he decided it was unacceptable for Israel to develop nuclear weapons. Kennedy’s reasons were both strategic and moral. Strategically, Kennedy believed that if Israel developed nuclear weapons, Arab states would seek their own nuclear weapons.

This would trigger a nuclear arms race in the Middle East. Kennedy was trying to prevent nuclear proliferation globally. He had negotiated the limited testban treaty with the Soviet Union. He was pushing for broader non-prololiferation agreements. Israel developing nuclear weapons would undermine these efforts. Morally, Kennedy believed nuclear weapons were dangerous and that their spread needed to be stopped.

He had seen how close the world came to nuclear war during the Cuban missile crisis in October 1962. He was determined to prevent more countries from acquiring these weapons. In May 1961, Kennedy met with Bengurian in New York. Kennedy raised the Deona issue. He told Bengorian that the United States needed assurances that Israel was not developing nuclear weapons.

Bengurian gave those assurances. He said Deona was for peaceful purposes only. Kennedy didn’t believe him. American intelligence continued to monitor Deona. The facility was growing. Construction continued. The reactor was becoming operational. Kennedy decided he needed verification.

In the summer of 1961, he told Bengurian that the United States wanted to send inspectors to Deona. Bengurian initially refused. After pressure, he agreed to allow limited inspections. The first inspection occurred in May 1961. Two American scientists visited Deona. They were given a tour of the facility. They saw the reactor.

They spoke with Israeli scientists. They filed a report concluding that the reactor appeared to be for research purposes, but the inspection was inadequate. The Americans were shown only certain areas of the facility. They were not allowed to take samples. They were not allowed unrestricted access. Israeli officials controlled what they saw.

American intelligence agencies were not satisfied. They believed Israel was hiding the true purpose of Deona. They believed there were underground facilities the inspectors had not seen. Kennedy pressed for more inspections. In 1962, another team of American scientists visited Deona. Again, they were given limited access.

Again, their report was inconclusive. Behind the scenes, something significant was happening. Israel was deceiving the inspectors. Years later, after the facts became public, it was revealed that Israel had built a fake control room at Deona. When American inspectors visited, they were shown this fake control room. The real control room and the real work of the facility were hidden from them.

Kennedy suspected deception, but he didn’t have proof. He continued to pressure Bengurian. The correspondence between Kennedy and Benurian intensified in 1962 and 1963. Kennedy sent multiple letters. The letters were polite at first, but became increasingly firm. In a letter dated July 5th, 1963, Kennedy wrote to Benorian, “I am sure you will agree that there is no more urgent business for the whole world than the control of nuclear weapons.

We have been in touch with the Soviet Union and other countries regarding this issue.” Kennedy was making clear that Israel’s nuclear program was part of a larger global problem. He was treating Israel the same way he was treating other countries that might develop nuclear weapons. [snorts] Kennedy continued in the same letter, I am convinced that the nonprololiferation of nuclear weapons is vital to the security of Israel.

This was a key argument. Kennedy was telling Bengurian that nuclear weapons would actually make Israel less safe, not more safe. If Israel developed nuclear weapons, Arab states would pursue their own. Israel would face nuclear armed enemies. Better, Kennedy argued, to prevent nuclear weapons from entering the region at all.

Bengurian’s responses to Kennedy’s letters were evasive. He insisted Deona was peaceful. He provided limited information. He allowed limited inspections, but he did not stop the nuclear program. Kennedy became frustrated. In May 1963, he sent the letter quoted at the beginning of this script. The full text of that letter dated May 18th, 1963 has been declassified. Kennedy wrote, “Dear Mr.

Prime Minister, I welcome your letter of May 12 and am giving it careful study. Meanwhile, I have received from Ambassador Barber a report of his conversation with you on May 14th regarding the arrangements for visiting the Deona reactor. I should like to add some personal comments on that subject. I am sure you will agree that there is no more urgent business for the whole world than the control of nuclear weapons.

We have been in touch with the Soviet Union and with other countries regarding this issue and I can tell you that we have been making some progress. As I wrote to you on previous occasions, this government’s commitment to and support of Israel could be seriously jeopardized if it should be thought that we were unable to obtain reliable information on a subject as vital to peace as the question of Israel’s effort in the nuclear field.

Therefore, I asked our scientists to visit Deona as often as seemed necessary for us to obtain reliable information. When we spoke together in May 1961, you said that we could make whatever use of the visit of two scientists to Deona that we considered appropriate. I believe that this question of visits to the Deona reactor is of sufficient importance to both our countries that I should like to have a better understanding between us on this subject.

Kennedy then outlined what he expected. Regular visits, unrestricted access, and truthful information. This letter was the strongest pressure Kennedy had yet applied. The phrase seriously jeopardized was barely diplomatic. Kennedy was essentially threatening to reconsider US support for Israel if Bengurion did not comply. Ben Gurion received this letter.

He did not respond immediately. Instead, on June 16th, 1963, less than one month after receiving Kennedy’s letter, Bengurion resigned as prime minister of Israel. Bengurion’s resignation shocked Israel and the world. He was 76 years old. He had led Israel since its founding in 1948 with brief interruptions.

He was the father of the nation. His sudden resignation seemed to come out of nowhere. Bengurion cited personal reasons for his resignation. He said he was tired. He said he needed rest. He said internal political conflicts in his party had exhausted him. But the timing was striking. Kennedy’s harshest letter arrived in May. Ben Gurion resigned in June.

Some historians have suggested a connection. They argue that Ben Gurion resigned rather than comply with Kennedy’s demands rather than stop the nuclear program. Other historians are more cautious. They note that Benorian had been considering resignation for some time. They note that there were genuine political conflicts within his party.

They argue that the timing may have been coincidental. What is clear is that Benorian did not respond to Kennedy’s May 18 letter before resigning. He left the problem for his successor. Levi Eshkall became prime minister of Israel on June 26th, 1963. Ashkall inherited the crisis with Kennedy over Deona.

He took a different approach than Benorian. Eshkall sent a letter to Kennedy in July 1963. Eshkall’s letter was more consiliatory than Benorians had been. Eshkall agreed to annual visits by American scientists to Deona. He provided more information about the facility’s operations. He tried to ease Kennedy’s concerns. Kennedy accepted Ashkall’s commitments, but remained watchful.

Another inspection was scheduled for 1964. Then on November 22nd, 1963, Kennedy was assassinated in Dallas. Lynden Johnson became president and the pressure on Israel over Deona effectively ended. Johnson took a different approach to Israel than Kennedy had. Johnson was more supportive of Israel.

He was less concerned about Deona. The inspections continued for a few more years, but became increasingly prefuncter. American inspectors were still not getting full access, and the Johnson administration was not pushing as hard as Kennedy had. By 1967, Israel had developed nuclear weapons. The exact date Israel achieved nuclear capability is disputed.

Some historians say 1966, some say 1967, but it is generally agreed that by the time of the 6-day war in June 1967, Israel had operational nuclear weapons. Israel has never officially confirmed that it possesses nuclear weapons. The Israeli policy is called nuclear ambiguity or nuclear opacity. Israel neither confirms nor denies having nuclear weapons, but the evidence is overwhelming that Israel has had nuclear weapons since the late 1960s.

Today, Israel is estimated to possess between 80 and 400 nuclear warheads. The exact number is classified, but Israel is recognized as a nuclear armed state, though not officially. The story of Kennedy’s battle with Benorian over Deona raises several questions. What would have happened if Kennedy had lived? Would he have continued pressuring Israel? Would he have stopped the Israeli nuclear program? These questions cannot be answered with certainty.

But Kennedy’s track record suggests he would have continued the pressure. He was committed to non-prololiferation. He had confronted the Soviet Union during the Cuban missile crisis. He was not afraid of difficult diplomatic conflicts. Some historians argue that Kennedy’s assassination removed the most significant obstacle to Israel’s nuclear program.

They note that Lynden Johnson, while friendly to Israel, did not share Kennedy’s intense focus on non-prololiferation. They note that the inspections of Deona became less rigorous after Kennedy’s death. Other historians are more cautious. They note that even Kennedy might not have been able to stop Israel’s nuclear program. Israel saw nuclear weapons as essential to its survival.

Israel was surrounded by hostile Arab states. Israel had been through three major wars since 1948. Israeli leaders believed that nuclear weapons provided the ultimate guarantee against destruction. What is not in dispute is that Kennedy tried. He sent multiple letters. He demanded inspections. He pressured Bengurian.

He used the strongest diplomatic language short of threatening to end the USIsrael relationship entirely. The declassified letters between Kennedy and Bengurian are remarkable documents. They show a president willing to confront an ally over a matter of principle. They show an Israeli leader refusing to back down even under intense pressure.

They show a conflict that went to the heart of both nations security concerns. The letters are now available in the Kennedy Presidential Library and in the Israeli State Archives. Historians have published them. Anyone can read them. They provide a window into a moment when USIsrael relations were strained in ways that most people don’t realize.

Kennedy’s May 18th, 1963 letter, the one that warned that US support could be seriously jeopardized, is particularly striking when read today. It is hard to imagine any recent American president using such language with Israel. The USIsrael relationship has changed dramatically since 1963. Israel is now one of America’s closest allies.

The idea of an American president threatening to reconsider support for Israel over a policy disagreement seems almost unthinkable. But in 1963, the relationship was different. Israel was smaller, more vulnerable, more dependent on American support, and Kennedy felt he had leverage. He used it. Whether Kennedy was right or wrong about Israel’s nuclear program is a matter of debate.

Those who support Kennedy’s position argue that he was trying to prevent nuclear proliferation, that he was trying to stop an arms race in the Middle East, that his concerns were justified. Those who support Israel’s position argue that Israel needed nuclear weapons for its survival, that Arab states were existential threats, that Israel had the right to defend itself by any means necessary.

What is certain is that Kennedy made the attempt. He confronted Israel. He demanded transparency. He threatened consequences. And he failed. Israel developed nuclear weapons. The Middle East did not become nuclear-free. Kennedy’s non-prololiferation goals, at least regarding Israel, were not achieved.

Benurion resigned less than a month after Kennedy’s harshest letter. Kennedy died 6 months after sending that letter. Both men were gone before the end of 1963 and the nuclear issue was left unresolved. Today, Israel’s nuclear weapons are a fact. They are part of the strategic landscape of the Middle East. They shape how Israel is viewed by its neighbors and by the world.

And they all began at Deona at the facility that Kennedy tried so hard to inspect, to understand, to stop. What did JFK say to Israel about nuclear weapons? He said that US support could be seriously jeopardized if Israel did not allow full inspections. He said that preventing nuclear proliferation was urgent business for the whole world.

He said that Israel’s nuclear program could undermine global efforts to control nuclear weapons. He said these things in letters, in meetings, in diplomatic cables. He said them firmly, repeatedly, insistently. Israel listened. Israel made promises. Israel allowed limited inspections. But Israel did not stop. And when Kennedy died, the pressure ended.

The nuclear program continued and Israel became a nuclear power. Disclaimer: This video presents historical events based on declassified letters between JFK and Benurion, JFK Presidential Library, Israeli State Archives, Aer Cohen’s Israel and the Bomb, State Department cables, CIA reports, and verified historical documentation.

This content is for educational purposes.

May 18th, 1963. The White House, Washington, D.C. President John F. Kennedy sits at his desk in the Oval Office. He is composing a letter. The letter is addressed to Prime Minister David Bengurion of Israel. It is not a friendly letter. It is barely diplomatic. Kennedy writes, “This government’s commitment to and support of Israel could be seriously jeopardized if it should be thought that we were unable to obtain reliable information on a subject as vital to peace as the question of Israel’s effort in the nuclear field.”

This is the strongest language Kennedy has used with Israel. It is almost an ultimatum. The subject is Israel’s nuclear facility at Deona in the Ngev Desert. Kennedy wants American inspectors to have full access to the facility. Israel has been refusing and Kennedy has had enough. Less than one month after this letter is sent, David Bengurion will resign as Prime Minister of Israel.

6 months after this letter, John F. Kennedy will be dead. This is the story of what JFK said to Israel about nuclear weapons. How he pressured Israel to stop its nuclear program and how the conflict between Kennedy and Ben Gurion became one of the most serious crises in USIsrael relations. Let’s begin by understanding what was happening at Deona and why Kennedy cared so deeply about it.

In 1958, Israel began construction of a nuclear reactor in the Ngev Desert near the town of Deona. The facility was built with French assistance. France provided the reactor design, the equipment, and technical expertise. Israel told the world the facility was a textile plant. Later, Israel said it was a research reactor for peaceful purposes. Both statements were lies.

The facility at Deona was designed to produce plutonium for nuclear weapons. American intelligence agencies discovered the construction in 1960. U2 spy plane flights over Israel photographed the site. CIA analysts studied the photos. They concluded Israel was building a nuclear reactor far larger than needed for research.

They concluded Israel intended to develop nuclear weapons. In December 1960, outgoing President Dwight Eisenhower confronted Israeli officials about Deona. Bengurion, who was Prime Minister, admitted the facility existed, but insisted it was purely for peaceful research. Eisenhower was skeptical, but left the problem for the incoming president.

John F. Kennedy became president on January 20th, 1961. He inherited the Deona problem and he decided it was unacceptable for Israel to develop nuclear weapons. Kennedy’s reasons were both strategic and moral. Strategically, Kennedy believed that if Israel developed nuclear weapons, Arab states would seek their own nuclear weapons.

This would trigger a nuclear arms race in the Middle East. Kennedy was trying to prevent nuclear proliferation globally. He had negotiated the limited testban treaty with the Soviet Union. He was pushing for broader non-prololiferation agreements. Israel developing nuclear weapons would undermine these efforts. Morally, Kennedy believed nuclear weapons were dangerous and that their spread needed to be stopped.

He had seen how close the world came to nuclear war during the Cuban missile crisis in October 1962. He was determined to prevent more countries from acquiring these weapons. In May 1961, Kennedy met with Bengurian in New York. Kennedy raised the Deona issue. He told Bengorian that the United States needed assurances that Israel was not developing nuclear weapons.

Bengurian gave those assurances. He said Deona was for peaceful purposes only. Kennedy didn’t believe him. American intelligence continued to monitor Deona. The facility was growing. Construction continued. The reactor was becoming operational. Kennedy decided he needed verification.

In the summer of 1961, he told Bengurian that the United States wanted to send inspectors to Deona. Bengurian initially refused. After pressure, he agreed to allow limited inspections. The first inspection occurred in May 1961. Two American scientists visited Deona. They were given a tour of the facility. They saw the reactor.

They spoke with Israeli scientists. They filed a report concluding that the reactor appeared to be for research purposes, but the inspection was inadequate. The Americans were shown only certain areas of the facility. They were not allowed to take samples. They were not allowed unrestricted access. Israeli officials controlled what they saw.

American intelligence agencies were not satisfied. They believed Israel was hiding the true purpose of Deona. They believed there were underground facilities the inspectors had not seen. Kennedy pressed for more inspections. In 1962, another team of American scientists visited Deona. Again, they were given limited access.

Again, their report was inconclusive. Behind the scenes, something significant was happening. Israel was deceiving the inspectors. Years later, after the facts became public, it was revealed that Israel had built a fake control room at Deona. When American inspectors visited, they were shown this fake control room. The real control room and the real work of the facility were hidden from them.

Kennedy suspected deception, but he didn’t have proof. He continued to pressure Bengurian. The correspondence between Kennedy and Benurian intensified in 1962 and 1963. Kennedy sent multiple letters. The letters were polite at first, but became increasingly firm. In a letter dated July 5th, 1963, Kennedy wrote to Benorian, “I am sure you will agree that there is no more urgent business for the whole world than the control of nuclear weapons.

We have been in touch with the Soviet Union and other countries regarding this issue.” Kennedy was making clear that Israel’s nuclear program was part of a larger global problem. He was treating Israel the same way he was treating other countries that might develop nuclear weapons. [snorts] Kennedy continued in the same letter, I am convinced that the nonprololiferation of nuclear weapons is vital to the security of Israel.

This was a key argument. Kennedy was telling Bengurian that nuclear weapons would actually make Israel less safe, not more safe. If Israel developed nuclear weapons, Arab states would pursue their own. Israel would face nuclear armed enemies. Better, Kennedy argued, to prevent nuclear weapons from entering the region at all.

Bengurian’s responses to Kennedy’s letters were evasive. He insisted Deona was peaceful. He provided limited information. He allowed limited inspections, but he did not stop the nuclear program. Kennedy became frustrated. In May 1963, he sent the letter quoted at the beginning of this script. The full text of that letter dated May 18th, 1963 has been declassified. Kennedy wrote, “Dear Mr.

Prime Minister, I welcome your letter of May 12 and am giving it careful study. Meanwhile, I have received from Ambassador Barber a report of his conversation with you on May 14th regarding the arrangements for visiting the Deona reactor. I should like to add some personal comments on that subject. I am sure you will agree that there is no more urgent business for the whole world than the control of nuclear weapons.

We have been in touch with the Soviet Union and with other countries regarding this issue and I can tell you that we have been making some progress. As I wrote to you on previous occasions, this government’s commitment to and support of Israel could be seriously jeopardized if it should be thought that we were unable to obtain reliable information on a subject as vital to peace as the question of Israel’s effort in the nuclear field.

Therefore, I asked our scientists to visit Deona as often as seemed necessary for us to obtain reliable information. When we spoke together in May 1961, you said that we could make whatever use of the visit of two scientists to Deona that we considered appropriate. I believe that this question of visits to the Deona reactor is of sufficient importance to both our countries that I should like to have a better understanding between us on this subject.

Kennedy then outlined what he expected. Regular visits, unrestricted access, and truthful information. This letter was the strongest pressure Kennedy had yet applied. The phrase seriously jeopardized was barely diplomatic. Kennedy was essentially threatening to reconsider US support for Israel if Bengurion did not comply. Ben Gurion received this letter.

He did not respond immediately. Instead, on June 16th, 1963, less than one month after receiving Kennedy’s letter, Bengurion resigned as prime minister of Israel. Bengurion’s resignation shocked Israel and the world. He was 76 years old. He had led Israel since its founding in 1948 with brief interruptions.

He was the father of the nation. His sudden resignation seemed to come out of nowhere. Bengurion cited personal reasons for his resignation. He said he was tired. He said he needed rest. He said internal political conflicts in his party had exhausted him. But the timing was striking. Kennedy’s harshest letter arrived in May. Ben Gurion resigned in June.

Some historians have suggested a connection. They argue that Ben Gurion resigned rather than comply with Kennedy’s demands rather than stop the nuclear program. Other historians are more cautious. They note that Benorian had been considering resignation for some time. They note that there were genuine political conflicts within his party.

They argue that the timing may have been coincidental. What is clear is that Benorian did not respond to Kennedy’s May 18 letter before resigning. He left the problem for his successor. Levi Eshkall became prime minister of Israel on June 26th, 1963. Ashkall inherited the crisis with Kennedy over Deona.

He took a different approach than Benorian. Eshkall sent a letter to Kennedy in July 1963. Eshkall’s letter was more consiliatory than Benorians had been. Eshkall agreed to annual visits by American scientists to Deona. He provided more information about the facility’s operations. He tried to ease Kennedy’s concerns. Kennedy accepted Ashkall’s commitments, but remained watchful.

Another inspection was scheduled for 1964. Then on November 22nd, 1963, Kennedy was assassinated in Dallas. Lynden Johnson became president and the pressure on Israel over Deona effectively ended. Johnson took a different approach to Israel than Kennedy had. Johnson was more supportive of Israel.

He was less concerned about Deona. The inspections continued for a few more years, but became increasingly prefuncter. American inspectors were still not getting full access, and the Johnson administration was not pushing as hard as Kennedy had. By 1967, Israel had developed nuclear weapons. The exact date Israel achieved nuclear capability is disputed.

Some historians say 1966, some say 1967, but it is generally agreed that by the time of the 6-day war in June 1967, Israel had operational nuclear weapons. Israel has never officially confirmed that it possesses nuclear weapons. The Israeli policy is called nuclear ambiguity or nuclear opacity. Israel neither confirms nor denies having nuclear weapons, but the evidence is overwhelming that Israel has had nuclear weapons since the late 1960s.

Today, Israel is estimated to possess between 80 and 400 nuclear warheads. The exact number is classified, but Israel is recognized as a nuclear armed state, though not officially. The story of Kennedy’s battle with Benorian over Deona raises several questions. What would have happened if Kennedy had lived? Would he have continued pressuring Israel? Would he have stopped the Israeli nuclear program? These questions cannot be answered with certainty.

But Kennedy’s track record suggests he would have continued the pressure. He was committed to non-prololiferation. He had confronted the Soviet Union during the Cuban missile crisis. He was not afraid of difficult diplomatic conflicts. Some historians argue that Kennedy’s assassination removed the most significant obstacle to Israel’s nuclear program.

They note that Lynden Johnson, while friendly to Israel, did not share Kennedy’s intense focus on non-prololiferation. They note that the inspections of Deona became less rigorous after Kennedy’s death. Other historians are more cautious. They note that even Kennedy might not have been able to stop Israel’s nuclear program. Israel saw nuclear weapons as essential to its survival.

Israel was surrounded by hostile Arab states. Israel had been through three major wars since 1948. Israeli leaders believed that nuclear weapons provided the ultimate guarantee against destruction. What is not in dispute is that Kennedy tried. He sent multiple letters. He demanded inspections. He pressured Bengurian.

He used the strongest diplomatic language short of threatening to end the USIsrael relationship entirely. The declassified letters between Kennedy and Bengurian are remarkable documents. They show a president willing to confront an ally over a matter of principle. They show an Israeli leader refusing to back down even under intense pressure.

They show a conflict that went to the heart of both nations security concerns. The letters are now available in the Kennedy Presidential Library and in the Israeli State Archives. Historians have published them. Anyone can read them. They provide a window into a moment when USIsrael relations were strained in ways that most people don’t realize.

Kennedy’s May 18th, 1963 letter, the one that warned that US support could be seriously jeopardized, is particularly striking when read today. It is hard to imagine any recent American president using such language with Israel. The USIsrael relationship has changed dramatically since 1963. Israel is now one of America’s closest allies.

The idea of an American president threatening to reconsider support for Israel over a policy disagreement seems almost unthinkable. But in 1963, the relationship was different. Israel was smaller, more vulnerable, more dependent on American support, and Kennedy felt he had leverage. He used it. Whether Kennedy was right or wrong about Israel’s nuclear program is a matter of debate.

Those who support Kennedy’s position argue that he was trying to prevent nuclear proliferation, that he was trying to stop an arms race in the Middle East, that his concerns were justified. Those who support Israel’s position argue that Israel needed nuclear weapons for its survival, that Arab states were existential threats, that Israel had the right to defend itself by any means necessary.

What is certain is that Kennedy made the attempt. He confronted Israel. He demanded transparency. He threatened consequences. And he failed. Israel developed nuclear weapons. The Middle East did not become nuclear-free. Kennedy’s non-prololiferation goals, at least regarding Israel, were not achieved.

Benurion resigned less than a month after Kennedy’s harshest letter. Kennedy died 6 months after sending that letter. Both men were gone before the end of 1963 and the nuclear issue was left unresolved. Today, Israel’s nuclear weapons are a fact. They are part of the strategic landscape of the Middle East. They shape how Israel is viewed by its neighbors and by the world.

And they all began at Deona at the facility that Kennedy tried so hard to inspect, to understand, to stop. What did JFK say to Israel about nuclear weapons? He said that US support could be seriously jeopardized if Israel did not allow full inspections. He said that preventing nuclear proliferation was urgent business for the whole world.

He said that Israel’s nuclear program could undermine global efforts to control nuclear weapons. He said these things in letters, in meetings, in diplomatic cables. He said them firmly, repeatedly, insistently. Israel listened. Israel made promises. Israel allowed limited inspections. But Israel did not stop. And when Kennedy died, the pressure ended.

The nuclear program continued and Israel became a nuclear power. Disclaimer: This video presents historical events based on declassified letters between JFK and Benurion, JFK Presidential Library, Israeli State Archives, Aer Cohen’s Israel and the Bomb, State Department cables, CIA reports, and verified historical documentation.

This content is for educational purposes.